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Using a new weekly blue-chip index, this paper investigates the causes of stock price movements on 
the London market between 1823 and 1870. We find that economic fundamentals explain about 15 
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from the London Stock Exchange is used to ascertain what market participants thought were causing 
the largest movements on the market. The vast majority of large movements were attributed by the 
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changes on an independent list of events reaffirms these findings, suggesting that the most important 
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Equity listings on the London Stock Exchange increased substantially during the nineteenth 
century, making London the leading stock market in the world.
1
 The equity market played an 
important role in financing railways and other companies which helped transform the British 
economy in the nineteenth century. Equity also played an increasing role in individuals’ 
investment portfolios.
2
 However, we know very little about what moved equity prices in the 
short run or on a week-by-week basis on the London market during this formative period.  
In order to analyse what moved the London equity market in this era, we construct a 
weekly blue-chip index between 1823 and 1870.  We find that economic fundamentals, such 
as dividends, interest rates, exchange rates, gold prices and wheat prices, explain about 15 per 
cent of weekly movement in the stock market and up to 34 per cent of monthly movement. 
After identifying large movements in the stock market, we analyse contemporary press 
reporting on the market to ascertain what reporters thought were causing these large 
movements. Because stock trading was focused in the London Stock Exchange building, and 
journalists had direct access to traders on this market, it implies that the press were reporting 
on market participants’ informed opinion of what was moving the market. Because of this 
unique institutional set-up, we are confident that we can identify what events were moving 
prices in this early equity market.       
We identify 46 occasions on which there was a substantial market movement in the 
1823-70 period. Contemporary newspaper reporting on market movements provides 
                                                     
1
 See Acheson et al. ‘Rule Britannia’; Grossman, ‘New Indices’; Michie, London Stock Exchange, p. 88. 
2
 According to the Banking Alamanac and Yearbook (1856), there were 35,331 shareholdings in British banks in 
1855, and according to the Returns of the Number of Proprietors in Each Railway Company in the United 
Kingdom (P. P. 1856, CCXXXVIII), there were 166,125 shareholdings in British railways in 1855. See 
Rutterford et al., ‘Who comprised the nation’ for post-1870 estimates of shareholder numbers. 
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explanations for 40 of these substantial movements.  In terms of the unexplained substantial 
movements, four can be accounted for by developments during the railway promotion boom 
of the mid-1840s, leaving only two movements with no proximate explanation.  In terms of 
what the press perceived to be the causes of substantial movements in the market, about 50 
per cent were attributed to geopolitical events such as wars and revolutions.  The remainder 
were attributed to changes in monetary policy, financial crises, railway-sector news, and the 
effect of weather conditions on agriculture.   
We then use the alternative approach of identifying an independent list of events that 
might be expected to move markets, and noting the changes to our index on those weeks. 
This methodology has the advantage of identifying events that might be expected to move 
markets, but do not. The results of this analysis suggest that conflicts involving major 
European powers, especially France, were perceived as extremely important by investors. 
However, imperial wars, and wars involving the U.S., are not typically accompanied by 
substantial movements.  
This paper contributes to the historiography of British capital markets by, firstly, 
producing a high-frequency index for the 1823-70 period, and secondly, by analysing what 
was moving the market during this period. To date, scholars have developed monthly or 
annual stock market indices covering the nineteenth century for the UK.
3
 Other studies of 
what moved the UK capital market in the nineteenth century have focused on the market for 
government debt.
4
  Thus, this paper is the first study to look at what moved the UK equity 
market in its formative years, providing insights into what events and economic news 
influenced the value of early publicly-listed companies.  
                                                     
3
 Grossman, ‘New Indices’; Acheson et al., ‘Rule Britannia’. 
4
 Elmendorf, Hirschfield and Weil, ‘Effect of News’; Brown, Burdekin and Weidenmier ‘Volatility’; Ferguson, 
‘Political Risk’. 
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This paper also contributes to a growing literature which uses the capital market to 
provide insights into how contemporaries viewed the seriousness of historical events.
5
 Since 
capital markets aggregate the views of many diverse investors, they provide economic as well 
as other types of historians with an insight into how contemporaries viewed the importance of 
particular events. 
Our paper contributes to the literature in financial economics which focuses on what 
moves markets and how many market movements can be explained by changes in 
fundamentals. Cutler et al., for example, find that most large movements in the twentieth-
century stock market cannot be explained by news relating to fundamental values.
6
 Roll, 
Haugen et al., Mitchell and Mulherin, and Fair all report similar findings.
7
 By way of 
contrast, we find that a greater proportion of movements in nineteenth-century share prices 
were explained by changes in fundamentals, and that most large movements were explained 
by the contemporary financial press.   
This paper is structured as follows. Section one outlines our data sources and the 
methodology used to construct our weekly blue-chip stock index for the UK market. In 
section two, we regress various real and monetary data on stock price changes in order to 
assess which factors are affecting share prices and how much variation in stock-price 
movements can be explained by economic fundamentals. The third section identifies the 
dates of substantial movements in our blue-chip index and outlines the explanations provided 
by the contemporary press. In section four, we identify the dates of wars, large changes to the 
                                                     
5
 Frey and Kucher, ‘History’; Brown and Burdekin, ‘German Debt’; Ferguson, ‘Political Risk’; Choudhry, 
‘World War II Events’; Turner and Zhan, ‘Property Rights’; Ho and Li, ‘A Mirror of History’.  
6
 Cutler, Poterba and Summers, ‘Stock Prices’. 
7
 Roll, ‘Stochastic Dependence’; Haugen, Talmor and Torous, ‘Effect of Volatility’; Mitchell and Mulherin, 
‘Impact of Public Information’; Fair, ‘Events’. 
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bank rate, and financial crises, and investigate the returns to our index on these dates in order 
to see if events which one would expect to move markets did not.  
 
I 
The British equity market grew substantially over the period 1823 to 1870, with the number 
of equity securities doubling from just below 200 and the market value of equities growing 
from less than 10 per cent of GDP to 27 per cent of GDP.
8
 There were four promotion booms 
which contributed to the expansion of the equity market: the first, in 1824-5, predominantly 
involved mining and insurance companies; the second, in the mid-1830s, involved joint-stock 
banks and railways, the third was the railway promotional boom of the mid-1840s, and the 
fourth was associated with the passing of the 1862 Companies Act, the final legislative act in 
the liberalisation of UK incorporation law. The cumulative effect of all these booms was to 
change the equity market from one dominated by canals, docks and insurance companies in 
1825 to one dominated by railways, banks and insurance companies in 1870.
9
     
To analyse what moved the nineteenth-century equity market, we develop a weekly 
blue-chip index of shares for the London equity market from 1823 to 1870.
10
  The index 
consists of the primary common equity issue of the 30 largest companies on the London 
market.  The index excludes State-chartered entities such as the Bank of England because we 
are interested in what was moving the equity prices of wholly private companies and not 
those closely aligned with the State. The constituents of the index in year t were based on the 
30 largest companies by market capitalisation at the end of year t-1.  Thus the constituents of 
                                                     
8
 Acheson et al. ‘Rule Britannia’, pp. 1114-6. 
9
 In 1825, canals, docks and insurance companies had 84 per cent of market capitalisation and in 1870, banks, 
railways and insurance companies had 78 per cent – see Acheson et al., ‘Rule Britannia’, pp. 1117-8. 
10
 We follow the method laid out in Le Bris and Hautcoeur, ‘A Challenge to Triumphant Optimists’. 
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the index changed annually so that the index reflects changes in the industrial composition of 
the market over time.  To make sure that the index did not become dominated by one sector, 
we added additional companies to the index if there were more than 20 companies from the 
one sector in it.  This only occurred on two occasions – 1848 and 1849, when one and six 
non-railway companies respectively were added to the index.  The constituents of the index 
are in Appendix Table 1.  From Table 1, which shows the industrial make-up of the index 
over the sample period, we see that financial companies are an important component of the 
index across time, whilst canals, and later railways, are also prominent. This implies that our 
blue-chip index is representative of the overall equity market. In addition, given that the 
industries which make up our index served a wide variety of other industries and businesses 
in this era, our index reflects a wide variety of industrial experiences in this era. 
<<INSERT TABLE 1 HERE>> 
A caveat has to be placed on the exercise we are undertaking because the British 
equity market was in its infancy in this period and we need to make allowance for the 
historical context that the British equity market operated in.  
First, the companies which traded on the equity market had a small base of 
shareholders, numbering in the hundreds and in the case of a few large railways and banks in 
our index, the thousands.
11
 This meant that most stocks would have been relatively illiquid. 
The small shareholder constituencies would have also meant that shareholders were 
intimately knowledgeable about the companies they invested in and company specific 
information may have moved share prices more than wider economic events. This implies 
that we should not find wider economic and political events playing as much of a role in 
moving stock prices as they do today. 
                                                     
11
 Acheson et al., ‘Corporate ownership’.  
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Second, the index is a reflection of what was traded on the London market and it may 
not always accurately reflect what was happening in the provinces and provincial stock 
exchanges.
12
 Some of the companies, particularly the railways and canals, would have been 
exposed to particular regional factors, but as our results will show, we do not find much 
evidence of major region-specific events having an impact. 
Third, in this era, several companies established in the UK, and listed their equity on 
the London market, but operated in the colonies. As can be seen from Appendix Table 1, 
there are several overseas and colonial banks in our index at various times – these were 
pioneers of British multinational banking.
13
  They listed in London because they raised most 
of their capital, and some deposits, in the UK and they were originally set up to finance 
foreign trade between colonies and the UK.
14
 Arguably, the share prices of these banks will 
be affected by the conditions in the country they are operating in, but because of their 
connection to the UK in terms of raising funds and financing trade with the UK, they would 
also have been be affected by economic conditions in the UK. However, most of the overseas 
banks in our index are only in it for two to three years and only three overseas banks are in 
the index for a long period – Bank of Australasia, Oriental Bank Corporation and Union of 
Australia. As a robustness check, this paper’s analysis is repeated with these three firms 
removed, but this results in no material difference to our findings. 
The source of our share price, nominal capital, paid-up capital, and number of issued 
shares data is the Course of the Exchange (COE), which was a stockbroker list for the 
London market published on a Tuesday and Friday. To calculate the weekly index, we took 
the price reported in the Friday issue of the COE for each week between 1823 and 1870. In 
total, we have 74,827 observations spread over 2,505 weeks.  
                                                     
12
 On the rise of the provincial stock exchanges, see Thomas, Provincial Stock Exchanges. 
13
 See Jones, British Multinational Banking for the history of these banks. 
14
 Jones, British Multinational Banking, p.14. 
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Stocks in the period often did not have all their capital paid up.
15
 The price listed in 
the COE reflected only paid-up capital, so this price could change dramatically when 
companies made calls on capital. We make appropriate adjustments to our calculations of 
stock price changes on dates where calls were made, on dates where additional equity was 
issued, and on dates when stock and reverse stock splits occurred.
16
 We are unable to adjust 
our return series for ex-dividend effects because ex-dividend dates are not systematically 
reported in the COE – less than 40 per cent of dates are reported.17 There are also problems 
with stale reporting of ex-dividend dates and stale share prices being reported on ex-dividend 
dates. However, although we cannot adjust every company with regards when their dividends 
are paid, we do control for potential clustering of ex-dividend dates in the next section of the 
paper. 
We calculate both price-weighted and equally-weighted returns. These returns are not 
total returns, but capital appreciation i.e., percentage changes in stock prices. We use returns 
in this paper as a short hand for capital appreciation. The price-weighted returns were 
calculated as follows: 
Index return at week t:   Rt= ∑ (wi,t
N
i=1 ×ri,t)       (1) 
with wi,t= pi,t-1 ∑ pi,t-1
N
i=1⁄    and 
ri,t= ((pi,t-pi,t-1)-(ci,t-ci,t-1)) (pi,t-1+(ci,t-ci,t-1))⁄  
where N is the number of stocks, pi is the price of stock i at time t and ci is the paid-up value 
of stock i at time t. 
                                                     
15
 Acheson et al., ‘Character and Denomination’. 
16
 When capital is called up, we adjust returns by the size of the capital call. When splits occurred or additional 
equity was issued, we omitted those stocks from the index on the relevant dates.  
17
 For more on dividend policy in this era, see Turner et al., ‘Why do firms pay dividends?’  
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Equally-weighted returns were calculated as follows: 
Index return at week t:   Rt= ∑ (wi,t
N
i=1 ×ri,t)      (2) 
with wi,t= 1 N⁄  and                   
ri,t= ln { ((pi,t-pi,t-1)-(ci,t-ci,t-1)) (pi,t-1+(ci,t-ci,t-1))}⁄  
where N is the number of stocks, pi is the price of stock i at time t, and ci is the paid-up value 
of stock i at time t.  
As some stocks were infrequently traded, we calculate two sets of returns for the sake 
of robustness: one which includes only information on stocks which traded on consecutive 
weeks and one which assumes that stocks not traded on a particular week did not change in 
price. Since the method we use does not dramatically alter our conclusions, only the latter are 
reported for the sake of brevity.  
As we are particularly interested in large movements of the market in general, we 
want to differentiate between large movements in the index due to substantial movements in 
one or two stocks as compared to a general movement of the overall market. We therefore 
construct a co-movement differential variable, which is defined as the difference between the 
number of stocks which increase in price in week t and the number of stocks which decrease 
in price in week t.
18
 
Figure 1, which shows the weekly equally-weighted returns, reveals that there are 
some large weekly movements across the period.  In Figure 2, it is clear that the distribution 
of stock returns is leptokurtic relative to the normal distribution, with substantially more 
extreme values. This is consistent with the observed distribution of modern stock-price 
                                                     
18
 An alternative approach, used by Chang et al., ‘An examination of herd behavior’ measures the dispersion of 
stocks around the mean.  
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returns, eighteenth-century British stock returns, and eighteenth-century Dutch stock 
returns.
19
  
  <<INSERT FIGURES 1 and 2 HERE>> 
Table 2 contains summary statistics for the returns and co-movement series.  Notably, 
the co-movement series ranges from -22 to 20, implying a lot of co-movement at particular 
times. 
<<INSERT TABLE 2 HERE>> 
  
II 
In this section, we assess the fraction of share price movements which can be accounted for 
by changes in economic fundamentals or conditions. As macroeconomic data was not 
produced in the nineteenth century, we use contemporarily-available data on real and 
monetary conditions to ascertain how much these variables explain share price movements. 
We use the Bank Rate, which was the Bank of England’s minimum discount rate, as a proxy 
for the short-term interest rate and as a measure of general monetary conditions.
20
  To further 
capture monetary conditions, we use weekly data on the Paris exchange rate as well as the 
price of foreign gold bars, both of which were obtained from the COE. The Paris exchange 
rate can also be considered as a proxy measure for international trading conditions.  For the 
sake of robustness, we use the Frankfurt exchange rate as reported by the COE as an 
alternative, but it makes no difference to our findings.   
We use the yield on three per cent Consols as a proxy for the long-term nominal 
interest rate.  Consol prices were obtained for Fridays from the COE. We also include the 
price of Bank of England stock because it dominated the pre-1870 equity market in terms of 
                                                     
19
 Harrison, ‘Similarities’. 
20
 Bank rate is reported in Clapham, Bank of England, Vol. II, pp. 419-30. 
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market capitalisation and was the locus of the monetary system.
21
  The Friday price of Bank 
Stock was obtained from the COE.  
To capture the effect of real business conditions, we use the average dividend per 
share / paid-up capital per share ratio for the constituent stocks in the index. This ratio was 
obtained from the COE for each stock for each week and it changed whenever there was an 
alteration in a company’s dividend or paid-up capital. 
To account for potential clustering of ex-dividend dates, we utilise the limited 
information on ex-dividend dates in the COE and include the number of shares reported as 
being ex-dividend in a particular week as an explanatory variable in the regression. The 
dynamics of our regression set-up captures that stale share prices may have been reported in 
the ex-dividend week and that prices may only have changed in subsequent weeks. However, 
the coefficients on lags of this variable are not significant, indicating that this was unlikely to 
be a major issue. 
Finally, given the importance of wheat at the time in determining the real wages of 
workers, we also use wheat prices as an economic fundamental. Wheat prices in this era have 
also been viewed as a proxy for what Rostow termed social tension, since high food prices 
contributed to social unrest.
22
  From 1823-1844, the minimum weekly price reported in the 
COE is used. From 1845-1864, the average weekly price reported in The Economist is used, 
and from 1865 onwards, the average weekly price reported in the London Gazette is used. 
We take first differences of each of these explanatory variables to create stationary 
variables. Summary statistics for each of our variables are reported in Table 3.  Augmented 
                                                     
21
 The correlation coefficient between Bank stock and Consols is only 0.20, so including both variables in the 
specification is unlikely to create collinearity problems. 
22
 Rostow, British Economy, pp.123-5; Storch, ‘Popular Festivity’. 
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Dickey-Fuller tests reported in Table 3 suggest that none of these explanatory variables 
contains a unit root and can therefore be treated as stationary.   
<<INSERT TABLE 3 HERE>> 
In order to provide a robust point of comparison with modern markets, we replicate 
the approach used by Cutler et al. which consists of two parts: a restricted vector 
autoregression (VAR) and an unrestricted regression.
23
 The restricted approach isolates the 
component of each of our economic time series that cannot be explained by past values of 
itself or other time series, creating seven ‘news’ variables. The share price returns are then 
regressed on each of these news variables. The unrestricted approach simply regresses the 
returns on each fundamental variable, using a variety of lags and leads. The explanatory 
power of news is assessed by comparing the adjusted R-squared of models using lags to 
models which also include contemporaneous and lead values. 
The structured VAR methodology is as follows. First, we run a vector autoregression 
(VAR) which includes only the explanatory variables. We then save the residuals from each 
regression in the system in order to isolate the component of each variable that is not 
explained by previous values of either itself or the other explanatory variables. These 
residuals are hereafter described as ‘news’ variables. 
The stock-price returns are then regressed on each of the news variables in the 
equation: 
Rt = α0 + α1ζ1t + α2ζ2t + α3ζ3t + α4ζ4t + α5ζ5t + α6ζ6t + α7ζ7t +α8ζ8t  (3) 
where Rt is the stock price return at time t and ζ1, ζ2…ζ8 are the ‘news’ variables. The results 
of these regressions for a variety of VAR lag lengths are reported in Table 4. Newey-West 
standard errors are used because Breusch-Pagen tests indicate heteroscedasticity in the model. 
We find that the ‘news’ variables explain only 8 to 10 per cent of weekly variation over the 
                                                     
23
 Cutler et al., ‘Stock Prices’. 
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entire period. Limiting the sample to post-1844 causes the adjusted R-squared to rise to 11-14 
per cent. When the methodology is repeated for monthly data, this rises to 11-21 per cent for 
the full sample and 24-26 per cent for the post-1844 period. This is substantially more 
variation in monthly data than can be explained by macroeconomic news variables in the 
twentieth century stock market.
24
  
 One question which arises from the above is why the ‘news’ variables explain more of 
the weekly variation post 1844? One possible explanation is that the emergence of railway 
stocks created a more liquid market because railways had large capital issues and a diffuse 
shareholder base, which numbered in the thousands for the railways in our index by the early 
1850s.
25
 The majority of companies prior to 1844 had less than 1,000 shareholders. Another 
explanation is that investors were learning through time how to interpret events and economic 
data, and so were more responsive to ‘news’ variables post-1844. A further explanation is 
that the development of telegraph system in the 1840s transformed communication flows 
between the London market and other UK cities, enabling investors and brokers in the 
regions to generate immediate buy and sell orders in response to events.
26
 The connection of 
the London market to those in Paris and New York in 1851 and 1866 respectively also 
quickened information flow between markets.
27
    
<<<INSERT TABLE 4 HERE>>> 
 
The structured VAR methodology suffers from two potential problems. First, it does 
not capture new information revealed at time t about future changes to fundamental variables. 
                                                     
24
 Cutler et al., ‘Stock Prices’. 
25
 Returns of the Number of Proprietors in Each Railway Company in the United Kingdom (P. P. 1856, 
CCXXXVIII) 
26
 Michie, London Stock Exchange, p. 73. 
27
 Michie, London Stock Exchange, p. 74. 
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Second, stock trading during the sample period was less liquid than in the modern era and 
therefore share prices may not have incorporated all new information quickly. This is 
reflected in positive autocorrelation between current and lagged values of the share price 
index.
28
 As a result, changes in a particular variable at time t-1 may still have an effect on 
share returns at time t. 
In order to overcome these issues, we use a less structured approach, whereby share-
price returns are regressed on past, current, and future values of economic time series.
29
 In 
this section, stock-price returns are regressed on economic fundamentals in three stages: (1) 
lagged values only; (2) lagged values plus current values; and (3) lagged values, current 
values and one future value. The difference in the adjusted R-squared for each stage of 
regressions describes the relative explanatory power of past, present, and future information. 
Using future values introduces an obvious reverse-causality issue, and we report these results 
for informational purposes only. 
The proposed relationship is not directly causal; rather, many of the explanatory 
variables are thought to act as proxies for types of news with relevance for the share market. 
It is unlikely that share market values are affecting past or present values of explanatory 
variables, given the relative economic insignificance of the equity market in this period.
30
 
The Paris exchange rate is a possible exception, but since it explains very little share price 
variation, this is not a serious issue. 
The adjusted R-squared values from the unrestricted regressions are presented in 
Table 5. Using weekly data, current values explain around 9 per cent more variation than 
                                                     
28
 An AR(4) model reveals statistically significant first and second lags of returns,  with coefficients of 0.1890 
and 0.0938 respectively. 
29
 Cutler et al., ‘Stock Prices’. 
30
 Acheson et al., ‘Rule Britannia’. 
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lagged values alone, increasing to 13 per cent for the period after 1844. For monthly data, this 
increases to around 22 per cent and 34 per cent respectively. Interestingly, this is substantially 
more variation than can be explained in modern monthly stock prices using macroeconomic 
data.
31
 
<<INSERT TABLE 5 HERE>> 
 The inclusion of future values rarely increases the explanatory power of the model by 
more than 1 per cent. This contrasts sharply with the findings of Cutler et al. who show that 
the explained proportion of twentieth century share price variation increases by up to 10 per 
cent on the addition of lead values.
32
 They interpret this as predominantly due to the effect of 
changes in the share market on future macroeconomic activity. It therefore appears that 
changes in nineteenth-century share prices had little effect on future economic activity as 
proxied by our variables, which is unsurprising given the small size of the stock market 
relative to overall economic activity.  
Table 6 shows the coefficients of variables from unrestricted regressions using weekly 
and monthly data. Each regression includes three lags, contemporaneous values, and one lead 
value of each variable. For the weekly data, contemporaneous changes in Bank stock, the 
Bank Rate, and Consols all have a statistically significant effect on stock returns. In the case 
of Consols, a one per cent increase (fall) in Consol prices is associated with a 
contemporaneous 0.29 per cent increase (fall) in stock returns.  The equity market takes time 
to adjust to changes in Consol prices as a one per cent increase (fall) in Consol prices this 
week is associated with a 0.14 per cent increase (fall) in stock returns in the following week.  
The primary determinant of Consol prices in the nineteenth century was both national and 
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 Cutler et al., ‘Stock Prices’. 
32
 Cutler et al., ‘Stock Prices’. 
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international political events.
33
  Thus we can see that both national and international political 
events may have played a role in moving the nineteenth-century equity market.
34
      
<<<INSERT TABLE 6 HERE>>> 
From Table 6, we see that a one percentage point increase (fall) in Bank Rate is 
associated with a contemporaneous 0.23 per cent fall (increase) in stock returns.  This 
suggests that changes in Bank Rate are quickly reflected in stock returns and that the market 
does not necessarily anticipate changes in Bank Rate. Overall, these results imply that 
monetary and credit conditions were important movers of stock prices in the nineteenth 
century. 
Changes in the price of Bank Stock have little economic effect, with a one per cent 
change in Bank Stock associated with a 0.03 per cent change in stock returns. The results in 
Table 6 also reveal that a one per cent increase (fall) in the Paris exchange rate is associated 
with a 0.013 per cent fall (increase) in stock returns in the previous week. This suggests that 
share price changes had a small impact on the future Paris exchange rate. 
The coefficients in Table 6 suggest that a 1 per cent increase (fall) in the price of 
foreign gold in bars is associated with a contemporaneous increase (fall) in share price returns 
                                                     
33
 Ferguson, ‘Political Risk’. 
34
 Politicians and peers of the realm may have had access to inside information on companies because many of 
them served as company directors or were closely linked to financiers. Politicians and peers were also investors 
in this era and they may have had inside information on political events, which they could have exploited in 
buying and selling shares. This insider trading could therefore be affecting our indices of capital appreciation.  
However, the limited available evidence suggests that insider trading was not prevalent in the Victorian era 
(Braggion and Moore, ‘How insiders traded’). In addition, Acheson et al. have documented positive 
autocorrelation in equity returns in this period, indicating that many stocks were illiquid (Acheson et al., ‘Rule 
Britannia’, p.1125). This illiquidity would have made it very difficult for insiders to exploit their informational 
advantages.     
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of 0.10 per cent. One additional firm in the sample going ex-dividend in a given week is 
associated with a contemporaneous decrease in returns of -0.06 per cent. However, changes 
to average dividend-par ratios and wheat prices do not appear to have any effect on share 
prices. 
Table 7 shows the results of Granger causality tests of the effect of each variable on 
the share price index, and vice-versa. At a five per cent significance level, changes to the 
Bank rRate, price of Consols, price of wheat, and number of firms going ex-dividend can 
explain some variation in future share prices, while changes to the price of Bank of England 
stock, Paris exchange rate, price of gold and dividend payments do not. The share price index 
can explain future variation in the Bank Rate, price of Consols, Paris exchange rate, price of 
gold and number of firms going ex-dividend. 
<<<INSERT TABLE 7 HERE>>> 
The main difference between the monthly and weekly regressions is that the 
coefficients of the Consols and Bank Rate variables are considerably larger for monthly data. 
A one per cent increase (fall) in Consol prices is associated with a contemporaneous 0.51 per 
cent increase (fall) in stock returns and a one percentage point increase (fall) in Bank Rate is 
associated with a contemporaneous 0.61 per cent fall (increase) in stock returns.  Changes in 
share prices also appear to have some predictive power for the following month’s Paris 
Exchange rate and price of Bank Stock. 
This section has demonstrated that real and monetary data explain up to 15 per cent of 
weekly variation and 34 per cent of monthly variation, with the explanatory power of our 
variables increasing considerably after 1844. However, a considerable proportion of share 
price movements remain unexplained. This is revealed by a closer look at the residuals from 
the weekly regression in Table 6.  The absolute residuals correlate very strongly with 
absolute stock returns, with a correlation coefficient of 0.91. In addition, many of the largest 
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movements in the index coincide with the largest residuals: the average absolute return for 
the 20 largest absolute residuals is 4.0 per cent, compared to 0.5 per cent for all residuals.  
III 
In this section, we identify weeks in which the share market experienced a substantial 
positive or negative return and examine the explanations provided for these by the 
contemporary press. This will provide insights into what types of events had the most impact 
on prices during this era. 
Applying this methodology to modern markets is generally problematic, because the 
number of trades is so large that they are effectively unobservable. As a result, newspapers 
are forced to attribute a cause to large movements ex post. This can result in disagreements 
between newspapers, making it difficult to use the press to determine the true cause of share 
price movements. In contrast, all trades in the period 1823-1870 were, by law, conducted 
from the floor of the London Stock Exchange.
35
 Bid and ask prices were announced publicly, 
and news was brought to the Exchange through official announcements. Journalists could 
therefore discuss the reasons for share price movements with the brokers and jobbers, and 
observe the general reaction to news announcements. The resulting newspaper sections 
provide detailed daily accounts of exactly when prices changed, the reasons why they 
changed, and sometimes details on which investors had caused prices to change. The relative 
accuracy of these reports can be seen from the remarkable absence of disagreement between 
daily newspapers as to the cause of movements. All 22 movements reported in both Daily 
News and The Morning Chronicle between 1847 and 1861, when the latter ceased 
publication, were attributed to a similar cause, despite these newspapers holding directly 
opposing political views. In summary, this unique institutional environment enables us to 
identify the ultimate causes of major market movements. 
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In order to understand what was moving markets, we need to identify substantial 
movements in this era. We define a substantial movement in the stock market as an increase 
or decrease of 1.5 per cent in both the equally-weighted returns and price-weighted returns. A 
1.5 per cent return is more substantial than it appears by modern standards since it is 
equivalent to about 2.3 standard deviations from the mean. We use both series of returns in 
combination to eliminate large returns which may be a result of choice of weighting.  To 
account for the effect of large idiosyncratic movements in one or two stocks on our stock-
market index, we also require that the co-movement differential be at least plus or minus five, 
depending on whether returns have increased or decreased. In order to account for the 
potential clustering of ex-dividend dates, we omit stocks from our calculations of returns 
when the COE reports that they are ex-dividend.  
As can be seen from Table 8, applying this method results in 27 dates on which there 
was a substantial negative weekly return and 19 dates on which there was a substantial 
positive return. The median absolute return of the 46 substantial movements is 2.9 and the 
vast majority of these substantial movements are well above the 1.5 per cent threshold.  The 
median positive return is 2.6 per cent and the median negative return is -2.9 per cent.  The 
largest positive weekly return is 5.7 per cent and the largest negative return is -5.2 per cent. 
Notably, only four of the 46 substantial movements occur before 1845.  This is consistent 
with the fact that the arrival of the large railways in the mid-1840s resulted in a more liquid 
market, but it may also reflect the absence of major events in this period. In comparison to 
the stock market in the twentieth century, substantial movements in this era were much 
smaller, perhaps suggesting a much less volatile market. 
<<<INSERT TABLE 8 HERE>>> 
Table 8 also contains the return on Consols and the excess returns of stocks over 
Consols.  One reason for comparing stock returns to the return on Consols is that it enables us 
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to see which substantial stock movements can be attributed to changes in the risk-free rate, as 
proxied by the return on Consols.  As can be seen from Table 8, there are 15 occasions when 
the absolute return on Consols is above 1.5 per cent and only four when it is between 1.0 and 
1.5 per cent.  Consequently, the absolute excess return on stocks exceeds 1.5 on 31 occasions, 
with 14 occasions when the excess return is negative and 17 when it is positive.  Overall, the 
evidence in Table 8 suggests that large stock movements were accompanied by large Consol 
movements on about 40 per cent of occasions.             
Having identified the substantial share price movements, we then use daily newspaper 
reports of stock market activity to establish a proximate cause for each event. The era covered 
in this study marked the beginning of extensive press coverage of financial markets.
36
  The 
Times (est. 1785) was by some distance the leading newspaper, with an estimated annual 
circulation of 8.9 million in 1845.
37
 However, its commentary on the equity market was 
sporadic and concise until the development of the market for railway shares, and even then its 
commentary rarely offered an analysis of market movements.  By way of contrast, the 
Morning Chronicle (est. 1769) and, in particular, the Daily News (est. 1846) had extensive 
coverage of the stock market in terms of reporting on the reasons for market movements.  In 
1846, the former had an annual circulation of 1.3 million and the latter had a circulation of 
3.5 million.
38
  Given the superiority of the reporting on the stock market by the Daily News, 
we use it as our newspaper source from 1846 onwards. The reasons given for stock 
movements in the Daily News were cross-referenced with those reported in the Morning 
Chronicle and The Times to ensure the veracity of the explanation given.   
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The press explanations for each substantial stock-market movement are summarised 
in Table 8. The ten largest falls in the stock market are largely the result of political events: 
the Crimean War, Franco-Prussian War, and French revolution of 1848 account for four of 
the five largest weekly losses on the stock market.  Financial crises account for two of the ten 
largest falls in the stock market.  The ten largest increases are attributed by the press to 
various factors, with none associated with equivalent movements in the Consols market.  
Two of these ten increases are substantial movements which neither the press nor we can 
attribute to any particular cause. 
The explanations given in Table 8 have been coded into different categories, namely 
Political (P), Monetary (M), Financial Crisis (F), Railway sector (R), Weather (W) or 
Unexplained (U). Nine substantial movements have two explanation categories, and one 
substantial movement has three.  In these instances, we categorise the movement as having 
two or three possible explanations.  Notably, political explanations are included in each of 
these ten cases. 
Summary statistics for each category of news are reported in Table 9. Political factors 
were fully or partially responsible for 26 of the large movements identified.  These were 
typically associated with large movements on the Consols market, but the absolute excess 
return on stocks still exceeds 1.5 per cent on 15 occasions.   
<INSERT TABLE 9 HERE> 
As can be seen from Table 8, political events associated with large movements were 
rarely about domestic issues. The only such examples are the 1826 budget which was 
unfavourably received by markets and two reactions relating to the Corn Law debate at the 
end of 1845. Rather geopolitical events in Europe such as wars, rumours of wars, and 
revolutions were the most common political causes of stock-price fluctuations: the French 
revolution of 1848, Crimean War, Second Italian War of Independence, Luxembourg Crisis, 
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and Franco-Prussian War were all associated with at least one substantial movement. At 
times the market moved in response to a perceived change in the threat of a conflict, even if 
one did not occur. For example, an unusually belligerent King’s Speech in 1830 precipitated 
a large stock price decline, and the Trent Incident of 1861 was said to have caused a negative 
shock to stock prices, with investors anticipating British involvement in the American Civil 
War. Conversely, stock prices increased in response to the signing of major peace treaties in 
1856, 1859, 1866 and 1867. The commitment of the U.S. to fighting Canadian rebels in 1838 
also resulted in an increase in the market.  
Eleven substantial movements are fully or partially attributed to monetary 
phenomena, most commonly a change in the Bank of England’s minimum discount rate. As 
can be seen from Table 9, these factors have a larger effect on stock prices than Consols, with 
the average absolute excess return being 2.20 per cent.  Interestingly, all the major 
movements attributed to monetary factors are positive.  Thus, it appears that on some 
occasions the stock market responded positively and substantially to the easing of monetary 
conditions.   
 Seven major movements were attributed by the press to a financial crisis (Table 9). In 
each of these episodes, stock and Consol prices both fall, thus the absolute excess return on 
the market is the lowest for any category in Table 9. Financial crises in the nineteenth century 
were usually associated with businesses struggling to discount bills and commercial 
bankruptcies, so the fact that financial crises caused substantial movements in the market is 
perhaps unsurprising.  During the sample period, there were financial or commercial crises in 
1825-6, 1837-9, 1847, 1857 and 1866.  Notably, the three most severe crises (1825-6, 1847 
and 1866) all caused substantial movements in the stock market.    
 Only one substantial movement in Table 8 (16 August 1867) is fully attributed to 
good weather raising the prospect of an abundant harvest. However, movements in August 
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and September 1866 are partially attributed to weather conditions.  Given the importance of 
agriculture to the economy, it is unsurprising that weather moved the market.   
Four substantial movements in Table 8 are attributed to the railway industry.  After 
the mid-1840s, the railways dominated the stock market, constituting more than half of total 
market capitalisation up until 1870.
39
  Consequently, it is not surprising that major railway 
news moved the stock market, but had little effect on the market for Consols (Table 9).  Thus 
railway news appears to have directly affected the expected future profits of underlying firms. 
Four of the six ‘unexplained’ movements occurred during the episode known as the 
‘Railway Mania’ in the mid-1840s, where hundreds of new railway companies were 
promoted and railway stocks suffered a substantial asset price reversal.  The increase of 30 
May 1845 was at the height of the speculative fever in the market for railway stocks, and the 
fall in the market on 24 October 1845 was just after very critical editorials in The Times and 
the Economist.
40
  The large share price falls on 23 June 1848 and 13 October 1848 are 
associated with railway companies issuing large calls on shareholders for unpaid capital, with 
investors offloading shares to avoid making these payments.
41
 If we accept these 
rationalisations for stock price movements on these dates, we are left with just two 
movements with no clear explanation: 13 December 1850 and 7 June 1867.  
Including dummies for these events in the 24-lag unrestricted regression increases the 
adjusted R-squared from 0.20 to 0.33 (not tabulated). The unexplained component, the 
remainder, is likely driven by smaller news stories which would have moved prices on a 
frequent basis, and company-specific information.  
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There are fewer large unexplained movements in our index than in modern markets, 
and even the largest movements are of a much smaller magnitude than those observed in the 
U.S. markets post World War II.
42
 What might be the reason for this? There are many 
possible candidates: a lower frequency of trading; an absence of institutional investors; a 
lower level of liquidity in the market; or a greater emphasis on company-specific news.  
 
IV 
In the previous section, we identified substantial movements in the equity market and 
examined the contemporary press to ascertain the causes of those movements. The three most 
common types of events which moved markets were wars and conflagrations, changes in 
monetary policy, and financial crises. Did these types of events have a consistent and 
predictable effect on share prices throughout this period? Were there any similar events that, 
given the results of section 4, might have been expected to move markets, but did not? 
In order to answer this question, this section identifies independent records of wars, 
bank rate changes, and financial crises, and investigates the returns on corresponding dates. 
This methodology has been used by Niederhoffer and Elmendorf, Hirschfield, and Weil, and 
has the potential to provide more precise insights into which type of event contemporaries 
believed was important.
43
 For example, determining exactly which types of conflict mattered 
to markets requires the identification of wars to which share prices did not respond.  
As an independent list of wars, we use the intra-state, inter-state and extra-state war 
packages compiled by the Correlates of War project.
44
 This list is edited to include only wars 
involving at least one of the UK, France, Italy, Netherlands, Austria, Prussia, Russia, or the 
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United States, resulting in a total of 70 wars. Seven wars for which the start date is unknown 
or uncertain are excluded, bringing the total to 63.
45
 These wars are then categorised 
according to the nature of each war and whether the UK was directly involved. 
Table 10 shows the complete list of wars alongside the corresponding returns on the 
index.
46
 The point at which markets respond to the declaration of war is expected to vary, so 
the returns at week t-1 and week t+1 are also reported. Wars between European powers were 
consistently received negatively by markets, even when Britain was not involved. The impact 
of European rebellions varies: the French rebellions in 1848 and 1849 result in negative 
returns, as do the Viennese, Milan, and Hungarian revolts of 1848. However, earlier 
independence movements generally do not. Colonial skirmishes rarely appear to have any 
impact on share prices, even those involving the UK. Neither of the major wars involving the 
U.S. had any impact on share prices. 
<<<INSERT TABLE 10 HERE>>> 
In general, conflicts are seen to have a consistent effect on share prices. The only 
example of an inter-state European conflict not accompanied by a substantial share price 
movement is the Franco-Spanish War of 1823. This is perhaps because this conflict was a 
continuation of an internal Spanish conflict, and posed no real threat to French political 
stability. There are no other clear examples of a conflict that unexpectedly had no influence 
on share prices. 
<<<INSERT TABLE 11 HERE>>> 
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46
 The negative movement before 20 June 1866 results from a fall in the price of Agra and Masterman’s stock, 
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Table 11 shows all substantial changes to the Bank Rate during the sample period, as 
reported by Clapham, alongside the returns before and after each change.
47
 A substantial 
change is defined as a change of 1.5% or more in a single week. Under normal conditions, 
bank rate increases (decreases) are expected to result in negative (positive) returns. Three 
bank rate increases are notably not accompanied by the expected share price changes. The 
increase of 29th October 1847 is of particular interest, as it is accompanied by significant 
positive returns. This occurs during a financial crisis, and Turner reports that money markets 
were reassured at the beginning of the week by the government indemnifying the Bank of 
England from breaking the Bank Charter Act.
48
  The increase of 6th November 1863 does not 
appear to affect markets either, and the Daily News reports that this was because the increase 
was ‘very generally anticipated and prepared for’.49 The increase of 16th November 1860 was 
notably larger than expected, however, and is followed by modest negative returns the 
following week. The Daily News reports that returns were not as negative as might be 
expected because the general body of investors approved of the Bank of England’s policy.50  
The only bank rate decrease inconsistent with the expected relationship is that of 17th 
August 1866, when returns were actually negative. This occurred during a turbulent period 
for stocks, following both the 1866 financial crisis and Seven Weeks War, both of which had 
exerted downward pressure on share prices. The positive returns on 6th September 1844 are 
relatively modest, occurring during the week in which the 1844 Bank Charter Act came into 
operation. 
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A third category of large movement is financial crises, which accounted for seven 
large weekly share price movements in the previous section. Turner reports five financial 
crises in this period, occurring in 1825-26, 1836, 1847, 1858, and 1866.
51
  Following Turner, 
each crisis is dated according to the week when the crisis reached its apex in that Bank of 
England (and government) assistance was given to the money markets. In the case of 1857, 
two dates are investigated: 8th October, when the Bank of England began to rapidly increase 
the discount rate, and 9th November, when the Western Bank of Scotland failed. 
<<<INSERT TABLE 12 HERE>>> 
 The share price returns during these crises are reported in Table 12. All crises are 
accompanied by substantial negative returns of less than -1.4 per cent. In the case of the 
1825-26 crisis, this understates its impact: there are seventeen consecutive weeks of negative 
returns between November 1825 and March 1826, and the share price index does not stabilise 
until the summer of 1826. In terms of severity, the 1847 and 1866 crises also appear to have 
had more of an impact than those which occurred in 1836 and 1857. However, it is notable 
that both the 1847 and 1866 crises are followed by positive returns at week t+1, perhaps 
underlining the effectiveness of government and Bank of England policy in dealing with 
these crises. 
 This section has found few examples of conflicts that were not accompanied by the 
expected share price changes. Wars between European powers were generally considered 
more important by markets than either colonial wars or wars in the Americas. We have also 
found no examples of financial crises unaccompanied by a decline in share prices. However, 
the effect of changes to the Bank Rate varies based on the wider financial context and 
whether the change was anticipated. 
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V 
Using a newly-constructed weekly stock-market index for the nineteenth-century, this paper 
has sought to understand what moved stocks in the period from 1823 to 1870.  We find that 
changes in economic fundamentals explain around 15 per cent of the variation in stock prices 
for the entire period and up to 35 per cent in the post-1845 market. Short-term interest rates 
and proxies for long-term interest rates were important explanatory variables, with exchange 
rates and aggregate dividends being somewhat less important.   
 In terms of what caused substantial movements in the market in the nineteenth 
century, geopolitical events were the most common reason given by the press. Specifically, 
wars and revolutions involving European powers are especially important, but imperial wars 
and wars involving the U.S. are not. Other common causes of large movements include 
monetary policy, financial crises, and railway sector news.  
The findings of this paper shed light on the development of the early equity market. In 
the era when equities became more widely held, it was economic and geopolitical news 
which affected stock prices most. This implies that they were regarded as being important 
risk factors and determinants of future performance, possibly helping to explain patterns of 
investment at this time.   
The findings also imply that were some important differences between the equity 
markets of this era and modern markets. Changes in economic variables explain more of the 
movements in the historical period than in modern markets. In addition, the number and scale 
of substantial movements were smaller than we find in modern markets, suggesting that 
modern markets are much more volatile, and the press was able to provide explanations for 
the vast majority of substantial movements in the Victorian equity market.  This differs from 
modern markets where the press and commentators are oftentimes unable to adequately 
explain substantial market movements. Another difference is that large movements in the 
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Victorian era are much less likely to be attributed to monetary policy changes than in the 
modern era.
52
 Future work should explore why the equity market evolved to become more 
volatile and why large market movements became more difficult to rationalise. 
 
<< Insert Appendix Table 1 here >> 
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Figure 1. Equally-Weighted Blue Chip Stock Returns, 1823-70 
Source: see text.  
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Figure 2. Equally-Weighted Returns Distribution, 1823-70 
Source: see text. 
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Figure 3. Equally-Weighted and Price-Weighted Returns Indices, 1823-70 
Source: see text.  
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Notes: 1=Bank; 2=British Mining; 3=Canals; 4=Colonial & Foreign Mines; 5=Docks; 6=Finance; 7=Gas-light & Coke; 
8=Insurance; 9=Miscellaneous; 10=Railways; 11=Roads & Bridges; 12=Telegraph; 13=Waterworks. 
 
 
Table 1. Constituents of Blue-Chip Stock Index by Industry 
  Industry 
Year 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 Total 
 
              
1823 0 0 16 0 3 0 1 6 0 0 1 0 3 30 
1824 0 0 16 0 4 0 1 6 0 0 0 0 3 30 
1825 0 0 17 0 2 0 1 6 2 0 0 0 2 30 
1826 0 0 17 0 3 0 1 6 0 0 0 0 3 30 
1827 0 0 16 1 3 0 1 6 0 0 0 0 3 30 
1828 1 0 14 1 4 0 1 6 0 0 1 0 2 30 
1829 1 0 14 0 4 0 2 6 0 1 0 0 2 30 
1830 1 0 14 0 4 0 2 6 0 1 0 0 2 30 
1831 1 0 12 0 4 0 2 7 0 1 1 0 2 30 
1832 1 0 12 0 4 0 3 6 0 1 1 0 2 30 
1833 1 0 12 0 3 0 3 7 1 1 0 0 2 30 
1834 1 1 10 1 3 0 3 7 1 1 0 0 2 30 
1835 2 1 10 0 3 0 2 7 1 2 0 0 2 30 
1836 4 1 9 0 3 0 1 6 0 4 0 0 2 30 
1837 6 1 7 0 3 0 1 6 0 4 0 0 2 30 
1838 5 1 8 0 3 0 1 6 0 5 0 0 1 30 
1839 4 1 8 0 2 0 1 6 0 6 0 0 2 30 
1840 5 1 7 0 2 0 1 6 0 6 0 0 2 30 
1841 5 1 5 0 3 0 1 5 0 9 0 0 1 30 
1842 5 0 5 0 3 0 1 5 0 10 0 0 1 30 
1843 5 0 5 0 3 0 1 5 0 9 0 0 2 30 
1844 2 0 4 0 3 0 0 5 0 14 0 0 2 30 
1845 2 0 3 0 3 0 0 5 0 15 0 0 2 30 
1846 2 0 3 0 3 0 0 4 0 16 0 0 2 30 
1847 1 0 2 0 3 0 0 3 0 20 0 0 1 30 
1848 1 0 2 0 3 0 0 3 0 21 0 0 1 31 
1849 2 0 3 0 3 0 0 3 1 24 0 0 0 36 
1850 2 0 1 0 3 0 0 5 0 19 0 0 0 30 
1851 4 0 2 0 3 0 0 5 1 15 0 0 0 30 
1852 4 0 2 0 3 0 0 5 1 14 0 0 1 30 
1853 3 0 1 0 3 0 0 4 0 19 0 0 0 30 
1854 5 0 2 0 3 0 0 3 0 17 0 0 0 30 
1855 5 0 2 0 3 0 0 2 1 17 0 0 0 30 
1856 6 0 2 0 3 0 0 2 1 16 0 0 0 30 
1857 6 0 2 0 3 0 0 2 1 16 0 0 0 30 
1858 5 0 1 0 3 0 0 3 1 17 0 0 0 30 
1859 5 0 1 0 3 0 0 3 1 17 0 0 0 30 
1860 6 0 1 0 2 0 0 3 1 17 0 0 0 30 
1861 5 0 1 0 2 0 0 3 1 18 0 0 0 30 
1862 7 0 1 0 2 0 0 3 1 16 0 0 0 30 
1863 8 0 1 0 2 0 1 2 1 15 0 0 0 30 
1864 10 0 1 0 2 0 1 1 1 14 0 0 0 30 
1865 10 0 1 0 2 0 1 0 1 15 0 0 0 30 
1866 10 0 0 0 2 0 1 0 1 16 0 0 0 30 
1867 8 0 1 0 2 1 1 1 1 15 0 0 0 30 
1868 10 0 0 0 2 0 1 1 1 15 0 0 0 30 
1869 9 0 0 0 2 0 1 1 1 14 0 2 0 30 
1870 8 0 0 0 2 0 2 1 1 14 0 2 0 30 
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Table 2. Summary Statistics of Weekly Stock Returns 
 
Mean Median Std. dev. Min Max N 
Price-weighted returns -0.00011 0.00002 0.00652 -0.05621 0.06455 2,504 
Equally weighted returns -0.00019 0.00012 0.00809 -0.06967 0.05654 2,504 
Co-movement differential 0.44 0.00 6.59 -22.00 20.00 2,504 
Source: see text.    
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Source: see text. 
Notes: ∆Bank Rate is the first difference of Bank Rate; ∆Bank Stock is the return on Bank Stock; ∆Consols is the return on 
Consols; ∆Paris is the first difference of the Paris exchange rate; ∆Gold is the first difference of the price of gold bars; and 
∆Wheat is the first difference in the price of wheat; ΔDividends is the change in the average dividend for each company in 
the index. *** denotes significance at the 1 per cent level.  The ADF test statistic has a 1 per cent critical value of -3.43.  
 
 
  
Table 3. Summary Statistics of First Differences of Fundamental Variables 
Variable Mean Std. dev. Min Max N 
ADF Test 
Statistic 
∆BankRate -0.0006 0.2281 -2.00 2.00 2,504 -39.96*** 
∆Bank Stock -0.0054 1.9804 -30.25 12.00 2,504 -53.72*** 
∆Consols 0.0051 0.6918 -6.25 4.38 2,504 -51.52*** 
∆Paris -0.0161 3.7577 -25.00 20.00 2,489 -49.60*** 
∆Gold 0.0012 0.2598 -4.50 3.00 2,504 -53.78*** 
∆Wheat 0.0088 1.5392 -11.00 17.00 2,504 -42.15*** 
ΔDividends -0.0037 0.4242 -5.835 9.85 2,503 -67.72*** 
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 Table 4. Restricted VAR - News and Stock Returns 
 
Panel A: Coefficients on News Variables - 1823-1870 Weekly Data 
Lags 
in 
VAR 
Bank 
Rate 
Consols 
Price 
Wheat 
Price 
Paris 
Exchange 
Rate 
Gold Price 
Dividend 
Rate 
Bank 
Stock 
Price 
Ex-Div 
Firms 
Adjusted 
R2 
3 
-0.0027** 0.0031*** -0.0001 -0.0001 0.0009** 0.0007 0.0003*** -0.0005*** 
0.0971 
(0.0010) (0.0004) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0001) (0.0002) 
6 
-0.0026** 0.0031*** -0.0001 -0.0001 0.0010*** 0.0006* 0.0003*** -0.0005*** 
0.0938 
(0.0010) (0.0004) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0001) (0.0002) 
12 
-0.0024** 0.0030*** -0.0001 -0.0001 0.0009*** 0.0005 0.0003** -0.0005** 
0.0844 
(0.0010) (0.0004) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0001) (0.0002) 
24 
-0.0025** 0.0031*** -0.0002 -0.0001 0.0010*** 0.0004 0.0003** -0.0006*** 
0.0841 
(0.0011) (0.0004) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0001) (0.0002) 
 
Panel B: Coefficients on News Variables - 1845-1870, Weekly Data 
Lags 
in 
VAR 
Bank 
Rate 
Consols 
Price 
Wheat 
Price 
Paris 
Exchange 
Rate 
Gold Price 
Dividend 
Rate 
Bank 
Stock 
Price 
Ex-Div 
Firms 
Adjusted 
R2 
3 
-0.0018* 0.0047*** -0.0002 -0.0000 0.0008 0.0019** 0.0004** -0.0005** 
0.1399 
(0.0010) (0.0005) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0026) (0.0007) (0.0002) (0.0002) 
6 
-0.0019* 0.0046*** -0.0003 -0.0000 0.0023 0.0018** 0.0004** -0.0005** 
0.1272 
(0.0011) (0.0006) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0023) (0.0007) (0.0002) (0.0002) 
12 
-0.0016 0.0047*** -0.0002 -0.0000 0.0021 0.0011 0.0004** -0.0006** 
0.1202 
(0.0011) (0.0006) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0029) (0.0008) (0.0002) (0.0003) 
24 -0.0021* 0.0049*** -0.0002 -0.0000 0.0036 0.0011 0.0004* -0.0008*** 
0.1117 
 
(0.0012) (0.0006) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0033) (0.0008) (0.0002) (0.0003) 
 
Panel C: Coefficients on News Variables - 1823-1870, Monthly Data 
Lags 
in 
VAR 
Bank 
Rate 
Consols 
Price 
Wheat 
Price 
Paris 
Exchange 
Rate 
Gold Price 
Dividend 
Rate 
Bank 
Stock 
Price 
Ex-Div 
Firms 
Adjusted 
R2 
3 
-0.0054*** 0.0052*** -0.0003 -0.0000** 0.0016 0.0018* 0.0006* -0.0010*** 
0.2123 
(0.0019) (0.0011) (0.0002) (0.0000) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0003) (0.0004) 
6 
-0.0058*** 0.0053*** -0.0004 -0.0000* 0.0020 0.0013 0.0003 -0.0011** 
0.1857 
(0.0019) (0.0012) (0.0002) (0.0000) (0.0014) (0.0013) (0.0003) (0.0005) 
12 
-0.0059*** 0.0053*** -0.0006** -0.0000 0.0025 0.0022 0.0002 -0.0011** 
0.1679 
(0.0019) (0.0013) (0.0003) (0.0000) (0.0015) (0.0017) (0.0003) (0.0006) 
24 
-0.0061*** 0.0048*** -0.0004 -0.0000 0.0048** 0.0033 0.0000 -0.0014** 
0.1106 
(0.0022) (0.0015) (0.0003) (0.0000) (0.0024) (0.0027) (0.0003) (0.0007) 
 
Panel D: Coefficients on News Variables - 1845-1870, Monthly Data 
Lags 
in 
VAR 
Bank 
Rate 
Consols 
Price 
Wheat 
Price 
Paris 
Exchange 
Rate 
Gold Price 
Dividend 
Rate 
Bank 
Stock 
Price 
Ex-Div 
Firms 
Adjusted 
R2 
3 
-0.0049** 0.0075*** -0.0005 -0.0000 -0.0047 0.0051* 0.0005 -0.0012** 
0.2686 
(0.0020) (0.0016) (0.0003) (0.0000) (0.0101) (0.0030) (0.0005) (0.0005) 
6 
-0.0062*** 0.0078*** -0.0005 -0.0000 -0.0022 0.0044 0.0003 -0.0010 
0.2398 
(0.0021) (0.0019) (0.0004) (0.0000) (0.0136) (0.0033) (0.0005) (0.0007) 
Notes: Regression of blue-chip stock index on news variables generated by vector autoregression of explanatory variables. 
Newey-West standard errors are in parenthesis. ***, ** and * denote significant at 1 per cent, 5 per cent, and 10 per cent 
levels respectively. 
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Table 5. Unrestricted Regression - News and Share Market Returns 
Panel A: Weekly Data, 1823-1870 
 Adjusted R
2
 
Lags in specification Lagged Lagged and Current 
Lagged, Current and 
Lead 
1 0.061 0.162 0.167 
3 0.066 0.160 0.164 
6 0.075 0.167 0.173 
12 0.097 0.180 0.185 
24 0.108 0.195 0.202 
Panel B: Weekly Data, 1845-1870 
 Adjusted R
2
 
Lags in specification Lagged Lagged and Current 
Lagged, Current and 
Lead 
1 0.070 0.220 0.222 
3 0.080 0.219 0.221 
6 0.099 0.230 0.234 
12 0.114 0.239 0.243 
24 0.120 0.253 0.261 
Panel C: Monthly Data, 1823-1870 
 Adjusted R
2
 
Lags in specification Lagged Lagged and Current 
Lagged, Current and 
Lead 
1 0.034 0.269 0.280 
3 0.042 0.277 0.288 
6 0.077 0.292 0.297 
12 0.057 0.270 0.276 
24 0.134 0.324 0.320 
Panel D: Monthly Data, 1845-1870 
 Adjusted R
2
 
Lags in specification Lagged Lagged and Current 
Lagged, Current and 
Lead 
1 0.022 0.329 0.331 
3 0.022 0.359 0.360 
6 0.019 0.355 0.349 
12 -0.005 0.336 0.322 
24 0.183 0.367 0.336 
Notes: Adjusted R2 of regressions of blue-chip stock index on explanatory variables. 
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Table 6. Coefficients of Variables in Unrestricted Regression with 3 Lags, 
1823-1870  
Panel A: Weekly Returns 
Lead 
/ Lag 
Stock 
Returns 
Δ Bank 
Rate 
Δ Consols 
Δ Bank 
Stock 
Δ Paris 
Δ Gold 
Price 
Δ Wheat 
Price 
Δ 
Dividends 
ExDiv 
Firms 
+1 
- -0.0012 0.0003 0.0001 -0.00013*** 0.0005 -0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0000 
- (0.0008) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0004) (0.0001) (0.0004) (0.0002) 
0 
- -0.0023** 0.0029*** 0.0003*** -0.0000 0.0010** -0.0001 0.0007 -0.0006*** 
- (0.0009) (0.0003) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0004) (0.0001) (0.0004) (0.0002) 
-1 
0.1189*** -0.0011 0.0014*** 0.0001 -0.0000 0.0001 0.0001 0.0004 -0.0002 
(0.0293) (0.0006) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0003) (0.0001) (0.0004) (0.0002) 
-2 
0.0757** 0.0002 0.0001 -0.0000 -0.0001 -0.0001 0.0001 0.0006* -0.0002 
(0.0362) (0.0008) (0.0003) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0005) (0.0001) (0.0003) (0.0002) 
-3 
0.0050 0.0007 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0001 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
(0.0286) (0.0007) (0.0003) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0003) (0.0001) (0.0003) (0.0002) 
 
Notes: Coefficients of regression of blue-chip stock index on explanatory variables with one lead variable and three lags. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Panel B: Monthly Returns 
Lead 
/ Lag 
Stock 
Returns 
Δ Bank 
Rate 
Δ Consols 
Δ Bank 
Stock 
Δ Paris 
Δ Gold 
Price 
Δ Wheat 
Price 
Δ 
Dividends 
ExDiv 
Firms 
+1 
- 0.0023* 0.0005 0.0005** -0.000*** -0.0013 -0.0002 0.0016 0.0001 
- (0.0013) (0.0009) (0.0003) (0.000) (0.0013) (0.0002) (0.0015) (0.0003) 
0 
- -0.0061*** 0.0051*** 0.0007** 0.000 0.0015 -0.0003* 0.0014 -0.0012*** 
- (0.0018) (0.0009) (0.0003) (0.000) (0.0012) (0.0002) (0.0010) (0.0003) 
-1 
0.1037** 0.0018 0.0009 0.0001 -0.000 0.0005 0.0003 -0.0014 -0.0006 
(0.0504) (0.0020) (0.0007) (0.0002) (0.000) (0.0010) (0.0003) (0.0012) (0.0005) 
-2 
0.0634 0.0013 0.0003 0.0002 0.000* -0.0007 0.0003 0.0008 0.0006 
(0.0516) (0.0016) (0.0007) (0.0002) (0.000) (0.0014) (0.0002) (0.0013) (0.0004) 
-3 
0.0547 0.0027 0.0004 -0.0001 -0.000** 0.0008 -0.0003 -0.0001 0.0005 
(0.0741) (0.0016) (0.0007) (0.0002) (0.000) (0.0014) (0.0002) (0.0013) (0.0003) 
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Table 7. Granger Causality Test Results After 24-lag VAR 
 
Panel A: Null hypothesis: Stock returns do not Granger-cause economic variables 
  
Chi-Squared P-value 
Equally-Weighted Returns Consols Price 75.3*** 0.000 
Equally-Weighted Returns Wheat Price 42.6** 0.011 
Equally-Weighted Returns Paris Exchange Rate 33.1 0.102 
Equally-Weighted Returns Gold Price 12.2 0.978 
Equally-Weighted Returns Dividend Rate 34.5* 0.075 
Equally-Weighted Returns Bank Stock Price 10.6 0.991 
Equally-Weighted Returns Ex-Div Firms 43.5*** 0.009 
Panel B: Null hypothesis: Economic variables do not Granger-cause stock returns 
  Chi-Squared P-value 
Bank Rate Equally-Weighted Returns 37.7** 0.037 
Consols Price Equally-Weighted Returns 42.1** 0.013 
Wheat Price Equally-Weighted Returns 28.7 0.233 
Paris Exchange Rate Equally-Weighted Returns 43.3*** 0.009 
Gold Price Equally-Weighted Returns 42.34** 0.012 
Dividend Rate Equally-Weighted Returns 35.2* 0.065 
Bank Stock Price Equally-Weighted Returns 20.6 0.665 
Ex-Div Firms Equally-Weighted Returns 47.1*** 0.003 
Notes: Results of Granger Causality tests after a 24-lag vector autoregression of equally-weighted returns on all 
other variables. ***, ** and * denote significant at 1 per cent, 5 per cent, and 10 per cent levels respectively. 
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Table 8.   Large Stock-Market Movements, 1823-1870 
Date 
Equally- 
weighted 
returns 
(%) 
Return 
on 
Consols 
(%) 
Excess 
returns 
 
(%) 
News media explanation [categorisation] 
10/02/1826 -2.25 -2.66 0.41 
Decline in money market attributed to speculators spreading a series of 
rumours. [F] 
17/03/1826 -1.78 -0.96 -0.82 New budget opens and share markets decline in response. [P] 
05/11/1830 -2.56 -3.42 0.86 
The King's speech is received very unfavourably by the markets because 
it hints at a more aggressive foreign policy. [P] 
16/02/1838 1.51 0.82 0.69 
American government reassures Britain of its commitment to protect 
Canada against rebellions, suggesting Britain will not need to involve 
itself in the conflict. [P] 
30/05/1845 2.03 0.25 1.78 
Gains in railway companies attributed to a significant increase in 
demand for shares rather than any particular news item. [U] 
24/10/1845 -2.44 -0.26 -2.18 
Prices continue to fall but the press cannot identify any underlying 
cause. [U] 
07/11/1845 -2.04 -1.68 -0.36 
Parliamentary debates over the Corn Laws and the railway market is 
further hit by a high-profile default. [R, P] 
28/11/1845 -2.60 -0.65 -1.95 
Large business failures reported from Paris, Dublin and provincial 
markets. [F] 
26/12/1845 2.93 0.00 2.93 
Lord John Russell, in favour of the repeal of the Corn Laws, is invited 
to form a government. [P] 
12/03/1847 -1.96 -1.80 -0.13 
A Newcastle joint-stock bank collapses, resulting in a "scramble for 
banknotes”. [F] 
15/10/1847 -3.49 -4.59 1.10 
Several east India trading companies collapse. Barclay Brothers and Co. 
suspended, sparking rumours about the solvency of several other 
institutions. [F] 
03/03/1848 -3.82 -7.06 3.24 French revolution begins. [P] 
10/03/1848 -3.14 -1.82 -1.32 
French revolution continues and the collapse of Caisse Gouin is cited as 
a catalyst for further price declines. Financial difficulties in Amsterdam 
and rumours of political upheaval in Germany and Italy. [P, F] 
07/04/1848 -3.30 0.31 -3.61 Losses attributed to further disturbances in France. [P] 
23/06/1848 -2.94 0.00 -2.94 Railway share market is very depressed with no clear cause. [U] 
13/10/1848 -4.29 -1.02 -3.27 
Panic in the railway market that later spreads to money market. Jobbers 
and dealers have their portfolios full of shares and are all sellers. [U] 
03/11/1848 5.65 0.73 4.92 Bank of England (BofE) reduces minimum rate of interest. [M] 
19/01/1849 2.59 0.98 1.61 Settlement of the account week brings favourable news. [M] 
13/12/1850 3.19 0.77 2.42 
Gains throughout the week but no clear cause is identified. Bankruptcy 
of a large investor, Mr. Peter Anderson, is said to add to the buoyancy 
of the market on Friday. [U] 
07/03/1851 3.27 0.39 2.88 
Very large volume of trading noted, reports of the public becoming very 
involved in trading by Friday. South Wales rises considerably 'on the 
belief that Great Western would support an extension'. [R] 
16/07/1852 2.29 0.25 2.04 Settlement of account week brings favourable news. [M] 
16/09/1853 -5.17 -1.55 -3.62 
Panic induced by disturbances in Russia and Turkey (later the Crimean 
War) and an anticipated increase in the interest rate by the BofE. [P, M] 
30/09/1853 -5.09 -2.77 -2.32 
Announcement that British and French fleets are to pass the Dardanelles 
sparks a panic in the money, share and corn markets. [P] 
13/01/1854 -1.93 -3.25 1.32 Allied fleets enter the Black Sea. [P] 
24/03/1854 -2.66 -1.93 -0.73 
Anglo-French ultimatum is issued demanding Russian withdrawal from 
Danubian Principalities. [P] 
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Sources: The Times, The Morning Chronicle, and Daily News. Notes: Excess returns are the difference between the return on 
Consols and the equally-weighted returns. Key to categorisations: F = financial crisis; M = monetary explanation; P = 
political; R = railway sector; U = unexplained; W = weather.  
Date 
Equally 
weighted 
returns 
(%) 
Return 
on 
Consols 
(%) 
Excess 
returns 
 
(%) 
News media explanation [categorisation] 
31/03/1854 -3.83 -3.79 0.04 
The previous week’s ultimatum is ignored, and Britain and France 
declare war on Russia. [P] 
25/01/1856 2.70 1.12 1.58 
Russia enters peace talks and the Czar orders generals to suspend 
hostilities. [P] 
04/12/1857 2.66 0.27 2.39 
Markets said to rise in anticipation of minimum discount rate being 
lowered and an improvement in the position of BofE. [M] 
29/04/1859 -3.39 -5.64 2.25 
Austria issues ultimatum for immobilisation of the Sardinian army, 
eventually leading to the Second Italian War of Independence. [P] 
03/06/1859 2.05 1.08 0.97 
Gains attributed to the “extraordinary ease of the money market” and to 
a major Austrian defeat. BofE raises the minimum discount rate. [M, P] 
15/07/1859 2.56 0.79 1.77 
France and Austria unexpectedly sign an armistice followed by a peace 
treaty. Subsequent “immense rebound” in continental prices. As a result 
further BofE discount rate decrease is anticipated. [P, M] 
06/12/1861 -1.88 -2.56 0.68 
Two diplomatic incidents, the Trent and Nashville affairs, invoke pro-
Confederate feeling that suggests the possibility of British involvement 
in the American Civil War. [P] 
04/11/1864 1.78 0.28 1.50 
Favourable returns from BofE and Bank of France are published. Bank 
of France reduces the minimum discount rate and it is inferred that BofE 
will too. [M] 
11/05/1866 -3.70 -1.44 -2.26 
Overend, Gurney and Co., suspends payments. A panic is sparked by 
the incendiary comments of the French Emperor and the King of Italy 
forming volunteer battalions. War is seen as inevitable. [F, P] 
25/05/1866 -3.10 -0.72 -2.38 
Rumours circulate about the solvency of several joint-stock banks and 
war grows more likely. [F, P] 
31/08/1866 2.63 0.85 1.78 
Austria and Prussia sign a peace treaty. An abundance of money and 
good harvest weather also supports markets. The minimum discount rate 
is lowered. [P, M] 
07/09/1866 2.22 0.28 1.94 
Markets continue to rise in response to peace in Europe, good harvest 
weather and a BofE rate reduction. [P, M, W] 
28/09/1866 -2.66 0.28 -2.94 
Concerns over Emperor Napoleon’s health and Eastern political factors 
as well as bad weather conditions. [P, W] 
04/01/1867 2.11 0.42 1.69 
Gains are attributed to “satisfactory character of the revenue returns, the 
renewed ease in the money market and the continued influx of gold to 
the bank”. [M] 
12/04/1867 -2.86 -0.55 -2.31 
Luxembourg crisis threatens war between France and Prussia. 
Diplomatic issues also raise the prospect of a rupture in relations 
between Britain and Spain. [P] 
24/05/1867 1.85 0.81 1.04 
Gains due to improved political situation following the Treaty of 
London and the ease of the money market and the firmness of the 
exchanges. [P] 
07/06/1867 2.97 -0.66 3.63 
Bank of France reduces minimum discount rate but this is not sufficient 
to explain the gains, which are mostly attributed to speculation. [U] 
28/06/1867 -2.88 0.66 -3.54 
Ongoing solvency problems at London, Brighton and South Coast 
Railway depress the railway market. [R] 
16/08/1867 2.49 0.13 2.36 Fine weather raises the prospect of an abundant harvest. [W] 
22/11/1867 -2.25 -0.13 -2.12 
Following the 30 per cent fall in London, Brighton and South Coast 
Railway stock, Caledonian Railway stock price falls 40 per cent in the 
space of a few weeks. Several others apply to parliament for the right to 
raise further capital. [R] 
22/07/1870 -4.81 -1.63 -3.18 France declares war on Prussia and Franco-Prussian war begins. [P] 
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Table 9.   Substantial Movement Explanations by Category 
Explanation 
category 
Number of 
substantial 
movements 
Number of 
occasions 
absolute excess 
return > 1.5% 
Average 
absolute 
equally 
weighted 
returns  
 
(%) 
Average 
absolute 
Consol 
movement  
 
 
(%) 
Average 
absolute excess 
return 
movement  
 
 
(%) 
Political 26 15 2.97 1.75 1.82 
Monetary  11 10 2.88 0.68 2.20 
Unexplained 6 6 2.97 0.49 2.70 
Financial Crisis 7 3 2.89 1.95 1.36 
Railways 4 3 2.61 0.72 2.23 
Weather 3 3 2.46 0.23 2.41 
Total 57 40 2.88 1.39 2.00 
Source: see text. 
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Table 10. Wars and Share Price Returns 
Conflict start 
date 
Conflict 
Return in 
week t-1(%) 
Return in 
week t (%) 
Return in week 
t+1 (%)  
Internal European Conflicts 
20/10/1827 Greek Independence 0.28 0.08 0.64 
25/07/1830 First French Insurrection -0.33 0.17 0.03 
25/08/1830 Belgian Independence 0.28 -0.31 0.30 
07/02/1831 First Polish 0.16 -0.72 -0.89 
01/07/1831 Miguelite War -0.57 -0.86 -1.57 
26/09/1834 Second Murid -0.34 0.06 -0.09 
10/07/1835 First Carlist War 0.03 0.08 0.97 
31/10/1835 
First Carlist War (France 
joins) 
0.10 0.27 -0.35 
15/02/1846 Cracow Revolt -0.11 2.07 -0.82 
13/03/1848 Viennese Revolt -3.14 -1.81 -1.06 
18/03/1848 Milan Five Day Revolt -1.81 -1.06 -1.76 
23/06/1848 Second French Insurrection -2.94 1.02 1.16 
09/09/1848 Hungarian -1.94 -1.21 0.26 
30/04/1849 Roman Republic -1.91 -0.51 -2.20 
16/07/1849 Hungarian (Russia joins) 1.68 -0.44 0.23 
22/01/1863 Second Polish 0.32 -0.36 0.01 
Inter-State European Conflicts 
07/04/1823 Franco-Spanish War 0.00 -0.42 -0.05 
26/04/1828 First Russo-Turkish -0.01 0.27 -0.17 
09/09/1840 Second Syrian, Phase 2 -0.14 -1.28 0.40 
24/03/1848 Austro-Sardinian -1.06 -1.77 -3.30 
10/04/1848 First Schleswig-Holstein -3.30 1.05 1.66 
31/03/1854 Crimean -3.71 0.71 1.77 
10/01/1855 Crimean (Italy joins) -0.12 0.49 0.72 
03/05/1859 Italian Unification -3.39 -1.59 -0.48 
01/02/1864 Second Schleswig-Holstein -0.82 -0.05 0.50 
20/06/1866 Seven Weeks -6.97 -1.03 3.49 
19/07/1870 Franco-Prussian -0.27 -4.81 -2.28 
Colonial Skirmishes (UK) 
24/09/1823 First British-Burmese 0.09 -0.12 -0.01 
20/01/1824 First British-Ashanti 0.64 1.40 0.40 
23/11/1825 British-Bharatpuran -0.04 -0.59 -0.40 
17/04/1838 First British-Zulu 0.59 -0.07 -0.26 
14/02/1839 First British-Afghan 0.62 -0.11 -0.49 
04/09/1839 First Opium -0.13 -1.12 0.33 
06/01/1843 British-Sind 0.30 -0.36 0.58 
28/12/1843 Gwalior 0.11 0.72 1.13 
13/12/1845 First British-Sikh -0.73 -0.04 2.93 
16/04/1846 First British-Xhosa -0.03 0.54 0.50 
18/05/1848 Second British-Sikh 1.92 1.47 -0.03 
20/10/1849 Chinese Pirates -2.11 1.67 0.53 
24/12/1850 Second British-Xhosa 0.74 -1.11 0.63 
05/04/1852 Second British-Burmese 0.08 0.07 0.31 
22/10/1856 Second Opium -0.42 0.48 0.42 
25/10/1856 Anglo-Persian 0.48 0.42 1.08 
10/05/1857 Indian Mutiny 0.29 0.33 0.05 
01/03/1862 Taiping Rebellion, Phase 2 0.20 0.07 0.29 
04/06/1863 British-Maori 0.86 0.37 -0.04 
25/06/1863 Shimonoseki War 0.04 0.50 0.25 
20/10/1863 British Umbeyla Campaign -0.13 0.55 0.28 
05/07/1864 Shimonoseki War -0.25 1.66 0.52 
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Table 10. Wars and Share Price Returns (cont.) 
Colonial Skirmishes (Other) 
23/07/1825 Dutch – Javanese -0.51 -0.04 -0.75 
28/09/1826 Russo-Persian 0.49 -0.71 0.49 
12/06/1830 French Occupation of Algiers 0.28 -0.01 0.07 
01/11/1839 First Franco-Algerian 0.03 -0.73 -0.41 
06/08/1844 Franco-Moroccan 0.47 -0.24 -1.70 
12/04/1848 First Dutch-Bali -3.30 1.05 1.66 
17/05/1856 French Conquest of Kabylia -0.10 1.69 0.06 
31/08/1858 First Franco-Vietnamese 0.38 -0.78 0.79 
20/02/1859 Netherlands-Bone 0.44 -0.85 -0.50 
16/04/1862 Franco-Mexican 0.10 0.39 -0.06 
24/04/1864 Russian-Kokand 0.42 0.92 -0.89 
12/01/1866 Russian-Bukharan 0.17 -0.44 -0.48 
Wars in Americas 
25/04/1846 Mexican-American 0.50 0.91 0.14 
10/04/1861 U.S. Civil War -1.00 0.41 0.33 
Source: Sarkees et al., Resort to War.  
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Table 11. Bank Rate Changes and Share Price 
Returns 
Date 
Bank Rate 
Change 
(%) 
Return 
in week 
t-1(%) 
Return 
in week t 
(%) 
Return 
in week 
t+1(%) 
Bank Rate Increases 
29/10/1847 2 -2.43 1.87 0.10 
16/11/1860 1.5 -0.04 -0.13 -0.06 
06/11/1863 2 0.28 -0.19 -0.81 
04/12/1863 2 0.62 -1.33 -0.73 
06/05/1864 2 0.92 -0.89 0.16 
06/10/1865 1.5 -0.20 -0.88 0.86 
11/05/1866 2 -0.02 -3.70 0.62 
29/07/1870 1.5 -4.81 -2.28 -1.86 
Bank Rate Decreases 
06/09/1844 -1.5 -0.39 0.56 -0.34 
25/12/1857 -2 0.55 1.75 0.81 
08/01/1858 -2 0.81 1.60 0.40 
17/08/1866 -2 -1.18 -0.76 0.14 
Source: Clapham, Bank of England 
 
Table 12. Financial Crises and Share Price 
Returns 
Date of 
Crisis 
Return in 
week t-1(%) 
Return in 
week t (%) 
Return in 
week t+1(%) 
14/12/1825 -1.46 -0.48 -0.32 
14/11/1836 0.59 -0.65 -1.52 
21/10/1847 -3.49 -2.43 1.87 
08/10/1857 0.19 -0.58 -1.54 
09/11/1857 -0.27 -1.58 0.12 
10/05/1866 -0.02 -3.70 0.62 
Source: Turner, Banking in Crisis  
 
  
49 
 
 
Appendix Table 1. Constituent Companies of Blue-Chip Stock Index 
Company Industry Year(s) in index 
Agra & Mastermans Bank 1865 
Agra & United Service Ltd Bank 1861-1864 
Anglo Austrian Bank 1869 
Bank of Australasia Bank 1839, 1841-1842, 1844, 1852-1859, 1863, 1865 
British North American Bank 1850-1851, 1855 
Colonial Bank 1839-1840 
Consolidated ltd Bank 1863-1864 
Imperial Ottoman Bank 1868-1869 
Liverpool   Bank 1836-1837 
London & County Bank 1864-1869 
London & Westminster Bank 1834-1869 
London Joint Stock Bank 1838-1842, 1848-1851, 1853-1869 
Manchester   Bank 1835-1837 
Manchester & Liverpool Bank 1835-1838 
National   Bank 1864-1868 
National Provincial of England Bank 1861-1869 
New South Wales Bank 1866-1868 
Northern & Central Bank of England Bank 1836 
Oriental Bank Corporation Bank 1853, 1856-1869 
Provincial of Ireland Bank 1827-1843, 1845, 1850-1851, 1860-1863, 1867 
Union of Australia Bank 1840-1842, 1852-1860, 1862-1865, 1867 
Union of London Bank 1854-1856, 1859, 1861-1869 
British Iron British mines 1833-1840 
Ashton & Oldham Canal 1825 
Birmingham Canal 1845-1864, 1866 
Coventry Canal 1825-1832 
Danube & Mayne Canal 1837-1838 
Ellesmere & Chester Canal 1825-1829 
Forth & Clyde Canal 1825-1842 
Gr& Junction-canal Canal 1825-1845, 1848 
Kennet & Avon Canal 1825-1839 
Lancaster Canal 1825-1827 
Leeds & Liverpool Canal 1825-1848, 1850-1851, 1853-1856 
Loughborough Canal 1826 
Mersey & Irwell Canal 1825-1829 
Monmouthshire Canal 1825-1834 
Oxford Canal 1825-1843 
Peak Forest Canal 1825-1826 
Regent's Canal 1825-1832 
Rochdale Canal 1825-1839 
Stafford & Worcester Canal 1825-1835 
Trent & Mersey Canal 1825-1844 
Worchester & Birmingham Canal 1825, 1828-1835 
Rel del Monte Colonial mines 1826-1827, 1833 
East & West India Docks 1840-1869 
East India Docks 1825-1831 
London Docks 1825-1863 
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Company Industry Year(s) in index 
London & St Katharine Docks 1864-1869 
St. Katharine Docks 1827-1858 
West India Docks 1825-1837 
National Discount Company Finance 1866 
Imperial Gas-light & coke 1831-1834, 1869 
Imperial Continental  Gas-light & coke 1862-1869 
Phoenix Gas-light & coke 1828-1833 
Westminster Chartered Gas-light & coke 1825-1842 
Alliance British & Foreign Insurance 1825-1853 
British Fire Insurance 1826-1842 
Globe Insurance 1825-1852 
Guardian Insurance 1825-1839, 1843-1845, 1849-1851 
Indemnity Marine Insurance 1857-1862 
London (ship) Insurance 1825-1834 
Rock Life Insurance 1825, 1830, 1832-1844, 1848-1861 
Royal Exchange Insurance 1825-1863, 1866-1869 
Canada Co / Canada Land Miscellaneous 1832-1834 
Peninsular & Oriental Steam Miscellaneous 1854-1869 
Royal Mail Steam Miscellaneous 1850-1851 
Birkenhead, Lanc. & Cheshire Railways 1851-1854 
Birmingham & Gloucester Railways 1844-1846 
Birmingham & Oxford Railways 1848-1849 
Bristol & Exeter Railways 1843-1861 
Caledonian Railways 1846-1848, 1852-1869 
East Lancashire Railways 1847-1849, 1852-1858 
Eastern Counties Railways 1845-1849, 1857-1861 
Edinburgh & Glasgow Railways 1841-1848, 1852, 1859-1863 
Glasgow & South-Western Railways 1852-1855, 1857-1869 
Grand Junction Railways 1835-1845 
Great Eastern Railways 1862-1869 
Great North of England Railways 1844-1849 
Great Northern Railways 1847-1869 
Great South & Western Railways 1848-1850, 1856 
Great Western Railways 1836-1869 
Hull & Selby  Railways 1845-1850 
Lancashire & Yorkshire Railways 1847-1869 
Lancaster & Carlisle Railways 1846-1859 
Liverpool & Manchester Railways 1828-1844 
London & North Western Railways 1846-1869 
London & Birmingham Railways 1834-1845 
London & Brighton Railways 1840-1846 
London & Greenwich Railways 1835 
London & South Western Railways 1847-1869 
London & Southampton Railways 1837 
London, Brighton & South Coast Railways 1847-1848, 1851-1869 
Manchester & Birmingham Railways 1840, 1843-1845 
Manchester & Leeds Railways 1838-1846 
Manchester, Sheffield & Lincolnshire Railways 1848, 1860-1861, 1864-1869 
Metropolitan Railways 1864-1869 
Metropolitan District Railways 1865 
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Company Industry Year(s) in index 
Midland   Railways 1844-1869 
Midland Counties Railways 1840-1841, 1843 
Newcastle & Berwick Railways 1846 
Newcastle & Carlisle Railways 1850-1851 
Newcastle & Darlington Junction Railways 1844 
Norfolk Railways 1846 
North British Railways 1846-1849, 1860 
North Eastern-Berwick Railways 1854-1869 
North Midland Railways 1838-1843, 1845 
North Staffordshire Railways 1846-1867 
North Union Railways 1845-1849 
Northern & Eastern Railways 1843 
South Wales Railways 1850-1859 
South-Eastern Railways 1849-1869 
South-Eastern & Dover Railways 1843-1844 
Stockton & Darlington Railways 1860, 1862 
Wilts, Somerset & Weymouth Railways 1850 
Windsor, Staines & South Western Railways 1849 
York & North Midland Railways 1841-1848, 1852 
York, Newcastle, & Berwick Railways 1849-1848, 1852-1853 
Commercial  Road 1827, 1830-1831 
Electric (& International) Telegraph 1868-1869 
Submarine Telegraph 1868-1869 
East London Waterworks 1825-1836, 1838-1839, 1842-1845, 1851 
Grand Junction Waterworks 1825-1826 
West Middlesex Waterworks 1825-1847 
 
 
